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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) 8221
SUBJECT: NBC/TV TODAY SHOW, BILL MUNROE AND JIM HARTZ
INTERVIEW WITH PAUL NITZE, TOM HOLSTEAD, AND CHALMERS
ROBERTS

FOR SECRETARY AT SONNENFELDT REQUEST FROM S/PRS

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW:

MUNROE: MR. NITZE, ASSUMING SOME OF THE FIGURES WE GET THIS MORNING ARE CORRECT, THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT CALLS FOR RUSSIA AND THE U.S. EACH TO BE ALLOWED A TOTAL OF 2500 MISSILES AND BOMBERS AND WITHIN THAT TOTAL EACH COUNTRY CAN HAVE 1200 TO 1300 MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS, WILL THIS AGREEMENT HALT OR SLOW THE ARMS RACE?

NITZE: I DON'T REALLY THINK IT WILL, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND ABOUT THE ARMS RACE, THAT FROM THE STAND-POINT OF THE U.S.- OUR BUDGET FOR STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE YEAR 1974 WAS A THIRD OF WHAT IT AVERAGED DURING THE SIX YEARS FROM 1956 TO 1962. SO THAT IN THE SENSE OF DIVERTING LARGE RESOURCES TO OUR STRATEGIC FORCES WE HAVE NOT DONE SO. I THINK THE REAL PROBLEM HERE IS THAT WE ARE NOW FACING THE IMMINENT DEPLOYMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION OF THIS NEW FAMILY OF WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH THEY RECENTLY HAVE BEEN TESTING BUT HAVE NOT YET DEPLOYED AND THE QUESTION AT

ISSUE IS, DOES THIS AGREEMENT REALLY RELIEVE IN ANY WAY THE DEFENSE PROBLEM THAT THE U.S. FACES IN MAINTAINING HIGH QUALITY DETERENTS OF A NUCLEAR WAR IN THE FACE OF THIS THREAT. I AM NOT SURE THAT IT DOES.

MUNROE: I'D LIKE TO GET TO THE MATTER OF U.S. SECURITY IN JUST A MOMENT, BUT INSOFAR AS SLOWING THE ARMS RACE DOWN YOU SAY THIS AGREEMENT PROBABLY WILL NOT DO THAT, IS IT A DISAPPOINTMENT TO YOU?

NITZE: IT IS A DISAPPOINTMENT TO ME. NOW I SHOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ONE CAN IMAGINE AN ARMS RACE BEYOND WHAT THIS WOULD PERMIT. THAT IT DOES PUT A CAP ON, BUT I DON'T THINK IT PUTS A CAP ON WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER TO BE THE PROBLEM THAT WE FACE.

MUNROE: MR. HOLSTEAD, WHAT IMPACT DOES THIS AGREEMENT HAVE ON THE ARMS RACE THE WAY YOU LOOK AT IT?

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HOLSTEAD: I THINK THE THING IT DOES FIRST OFF IS TO CHANGE THE DEFINITION OF AN ARMS RACE. IT PUTS THE CAP ON THE QUANTITATIVE ARMS RACE, THE NUMBERS; AND DOES IT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, THEN YEARS; BUT IT STATS OUT A WHOLE NEW KIND OF ARMS RACE, OR ACCELERATES ONE THAT HAS JUST BEEN GETTING STARTED -- A QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE.

IT GIVES GREAT INCENTIVE TO NEW KINDS OF THINGS WITHIN THE UPPER LIMITS OF THE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE ALLOWED. I THINK IF I WAS A MAN FROM MARS WHO ARRIVED LAST SUNDAY IN VLADIVOSTOK AND HEARD THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLARE THIS WAS THE GREATEST THING SINCE THE END OF WW II, I MAY BE MISQUOTING HIM, I'D HOP RIGHT BACK IN MY SPACESHIP AND GO BACK TO MARS AND START BUILDING A SHELTER.

MUNROE: YOU SAY THAT IN BOTH OF THESE COUNTRIES IF THEY HAVE A LIMIT ON QUANTITIES OF ARMS THEY ARE GOING TO PUT MONEY AND EFFORT INTO IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF WEAPONS?

HOLSTEAD: WELL, TO DO THAT THEY WILL TRY AND MAKE THEM MORE ACCURATE, SO THAT THEY CAN PROVIDE -- GIVE THEMSELVES BETTER OPPORTUNITIES TO THREATEN THE OTHER SIDES MISSILES -- THINGS THAT WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT ALREADY. FURTHERMORE THE LIMITS ON NUMBERS APPLY ONLY TO NUMBERS OF MISSILES THEMSELVES, THEY DON'T APPLY IN PARTICULAR TO THE NUMBERS OF MIRVS. THAT MARTIAN IS SEEING THE SECRETARY OF STATE... (MUNROE BREAKS IN -- YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT MULTIPLE WARHEADS--H. -- THAT CAN GO ON MANY OF THESE MISSILES) THIS MARTIAN IS HEARING THE SECRETARY

OF STATE TALKING ABOUT THE CAP ON THE ARMS RACE BUT HE IS TALKING ABOUT A WORLD WHERE BOTH THE U.S. AND THE S.U. MAY WIND UP WITH TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MIRVS THAT THEY CAN THROW AT EACH OTHER -- SIXTEEN, SEVENTEEN, TWENTY THOUSAND ATOMIC BOMBS LEFT IN THE ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES IS NOT EXACTLY AN END TO THE ARMS RACE.

MUNROE: MR. ROBERTS -

ROBERTS: WELL, I THINK WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LIKE PEOPLE CLIMBING UP THE LADDER IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND THE PROBLEM HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO TRY TO GET THE TWO COUNTRIES -- U.S. AND THE USSR -- ON THE SAME STEP SOMEWHERE. AND IN THAT SENSE THIS KIND OF AN AGREEMENT HAS VIRTUE BECAUSE IT DOES FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF IT AT THIS MOMENT PROVIDE SOME PARITY IN NUMBERS. OW AS MR. NITZE SAYS, THE GREAT NUMBER OF SUB-FACTORS HERE THAT WE HAVE TO LOOK AT VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE WE CAN MAKE ANY KIND OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. BUT I THINK, I AGREE WITH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, THAT THE PERCEPTION OF THE ARMS RACE, OF THE ARMS BALANCE, IS VERY IMPORTANT, BECAUSE ARMAMENTS, ARMS RACE, IS NOT JUST NUCLEAR WEAPONS; IT IS THE EFFECT ON THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL INTER-RELATIONSHIP AND I THINK THERE IS AT LEAST SOME VIRTUE IN WHAT KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT FORD HAVE DONE HERE,

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TRYING TO COME TO SOME EQUALITY OF NUMBERS. NOW YOU CAN PICK IT APART BEYOND THAT, OF COURSE, AND WE NEED TO KNOW A LOT MORE BUT I THINK THERE IS VIRTUE THERE TO START WITH.

MUNROE: ARE YOU SAYING THERE IS AT LEAST A PHILOSOPHICAL BREAKTHROUGH?

HOLSTEAD: I THINK THERE IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL THING HERE THAT HAS IMPORANCE TO THE U.S., IN THE WORLD'S PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. TODAY. ARE WE GOING UP AS A POWER OR ARE WE GOING DOWN AS A POWER; IT EFFECTS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL SORTS OF COUNTRIES NOT JUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR.

MUNROE: BARBARA HAS A QUESTION.

WALTERS: GENTLEMEN, PART OF THE DISCUSSION IN VLADIVOSTOK CONCERNED THE ME, WHICH IS THE MAJOR PROBLEM FACING THE WORLD TODAY, AND WHAT CAME OUT OF THIS VLADIVOSTOK MEETING WAS VERY VAGUE ABOUT THE ME -- CERTAINLY IN TERMS OF REDUCTION IN ARMS BY EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR THE U.S. TO EITHER THE ARAB NATIONS OR ISRAEL. CAN ANY OF YOU GIVE US ANY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT,

OR WHAT KIND OF ARMS REDUCTION, OR WHATEVER CAME OUT OF THE ME DISCUSSION IN VLADIVOSTOK?

ROBERTS: WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION; BUT THIS GOES TO THE POINT I WAS JUST MAKING. THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMS CONTROL, THE NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENT AND SPECIFIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS LIKE THE ME, BECAUSE ONLY IF YOU HAVE THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP -- POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP -- THAT IS IMPLICIT, OR POSSIBLY IMPLICIT IN THIS ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, CAN YOU EVEN HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING TO PLAY WITH US SOME KIND OF GAME OR PROCESS TO TRY AND KEEP THE ME FROM BLOWING UP IN EVERYBODY'S FACE. I THINK THERE IS THAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP, BUT THERE IS NO SPECIFIC ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION. WE DON'T HAVE THE FACTS.

MUNROE: LET US GO TO THE QUESTION YOU GOT INTO A MOMENT AGO, AS TO WHAT THIS AGREEMENT MIGHT DO. WHERE DOES IT LEAVE US IN RELATION TO U.S. SECURITY; IN RELATION TO HOW STRONG WE ARE RELATIVE TO THE RUSSIANS OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS?

MR. NITZE: WE ARE TALKING ONLY ABOUT THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC FIELD I TAKE IT. (MUNROE - YES). MY VIEW IS THAT TODAY WE ARE IN A POSITION OF REALLY A VERY GOOD DETERRENT SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE USSR. I CAN SEE NO CIRCUMSTANCES TODAY IN WHICH THE USSR COULD POSSIBLY GAIN ANYTHING BY INITIATING A NUCLEAR WAR WITH THE U.S. THE QUESTION IS, CAN WE MAINTAIN THAT. THE THING THAT THREATENS THAT IN MY VIEW IS THE IMMINENT SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF THESE LARGE MISSILES WITH LARGE WARHEADS WHICH CAN HAVE THE ACCURACY TO THREATEN OUR DETERRENT FORCES. NOW DOES THIS AGREEMENT HELP US IN THAT REGARD; I DO NOT

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THINK THAT THE LIMITS ARE ADEQUATE IN THAT REGARD, THEREFORE MUCH AS ONE WOULD WANT TO AVOID IT I THINK WE WILL HAVE TO ADJUST OURSELVES TO THOSE MEASURES WHICH ASSURE THE SURVIVABILITY OF ENOUGH OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCES

TO GIVE US HIGH QUALITY DETERRENCE INTO THE FUTURE. SO

WE AGREE WITH THE POINT THAT THIS DOES NOT REALLY LIMIT WE AGREE WITH THE POINT THAT THIS DOES NOT REALLY LIMIT THE ARMS EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE U.S.; IN FACT, WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE, A QUITE CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIGH-QUALITY DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR WAR. THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WE HAVE TO DO.

MUNROE: SO YOU ARE NOT SAYING THAT THIS AGREEMENT AUTOMATICALLY THREATENS U.S. SECURITY OVER ITS TEN-YEAR LIFE?

NITZE: I AM SAYING THAT IT DOES NOT RELIEVE THE DEFENSE PROBLEM TO THE EXTENT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SEEN IT, AND IT DOES LEAVE US WITH A REAL PROBLEM OF WHAT WE DO FROM HERE ON OUT IN ORDER TO BE SURE THAT WE MAINTAIN HIGH-QUALITY DETERRENCE.

MUNROE: MR. HOLSTEAD, ARE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEFENSE OF THE U.S., WHERE WE STAND IN RELATION TO OUR SECURITY OVER THE PERIOD OF THIS VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT?

HOLSTEAD: I AM CONCERNED THAT BOTH SIDES ARE GOING TO HAVE INCREASED THREATS, OR SENSE OF THREATS, TO THEIR SECURITY. BUT THIS COIN HAS TWO SIDES: THAT THE ACTIONS WE ARE GOING TO TAKE TO MEET THE CONCERNS THAT PAUL NITZE IS TALKING ABOUT ARE GOING TO BE MATCHED BY COMPARABLE ACTS ON THE SOVIET PART. WE ARE GOING UP A LADDER AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE REACTING TO EACH, BUT IT ISN'T JUST A ONESIDED THING. UNFORTUNATELY THIS AGREEMENT, FROM WHAT WE CAN SEE OF IT SO FAR, HAS DONE PRACTICALLY NOTHING ABOUT THE REAL CONCERN THAT HAS BEEN BOTHERING US DURING THE LAST FIVE TO TEN YEARS SINCE THE MISSILE RACE HAS EVOLVED. THOSE ARE CONCERNS ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR FORCES. IF YOU SAY YOU ARE LIMITED TO CERTAIN NUMBERS OF MISSILES BUT DON'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT HOW ACCURATE THOSE CAN BE OR HOW MANY BOMBS THEY CAN THROW AT YOU OR HOW MANY MIRVS, YOU ARE PROVIDING ADDED INCENTIVE TO BOTH SIDES TO FIND BETTER WAYS TO THREATEN THE OTHER SIDE'S MISSILE FORCES. THIS IS GOING TO DECREASE STABILITY, PROVIDE GREAT INCENTIVES TO TAKE RISKS, (MORE) THAN I THINK SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT HAD INCLUDED QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE CONTROLS MIGHT HAVE DONE.

MUNROE: MR. NITZE, WHY DO YOU DISAGREE WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT THE RACE IS NOW GOING TO BECOME ONE OF COMPETITION ON QUALITY?

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NITZE: IT DEPENDS WHAT QUALITY. WHAT MR. HOLSTEAD WAS SUGGESTING WAS, IT WOULD BECOME A COMPETITION IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DESTROY THE OTHER PERSON'S MISSILE FORCES. WHAT I WAS SAYING WAS, WE NEED TO DO THOSE THINGS WHICH WILL INCREASE THE SURVIVABILITY AND REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR OWN FORCES IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO HAVE A SECURE AND HIGH QUALITY DETERRENT. NOW THAT, I DO NOT THINK, THREATENS THE SOVIET UNION; I THINK THAT

CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY, CONTRIBUTES TO THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR. THESE ARE THINGS THAT HAVE TO BE DONE IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL FIELD, AND I HOPE NOTHING IS DONE IN THIS AGREEMENT WHICH WILL LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO PRESERVE HIGH QUALITY DETERRENCE FOR THE US.

HARTZ: THIS IS ALMOST A "DOCTOR STRANGELOVE" QUESTION, BUT I DON'T THINK WE CAN AVOID IT. WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT VULNERABILITY AND AMERICAN FORCES, FIRST YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER THE LARGE NUMBER OF UNDERWATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAT WE HAVE DEPLOYED AROUND IN SUBMARINES IN OCEANS AROUND THE WORLD. I WANT TO ASK YOU IF YOU THINK THOSE ARE VULNERABLE? ...AND SECOND, ARE WE TO ASSUME THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION LAUNCHES A NUCLEAR ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S., OUR MISSILES ARE GOING TO STAY IN SILOES OUT THERE IN MONTANA AND SUSTAIN A FIRST STRIKE? OR WOULD THEY NOT BE FIRED, AND WOULD THE SOVIET MISSILES, IN EFFECT, NOT HIT EMPTY SILOES?

NITZE: WITH RESPECT TO THAT LAST PART OF THE QUESTION, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE NEVER GET OURSELVES IN THE POSITION THAT WE HAVE TO RELY UPON LAUNCH ON WARNING WHICH IS IMPLIED BY YOUR QUESTION. IN OTHER WORDS, THE MOMENT YOU SEE ON YOUR RADAR SCREEN SOMETHING COMING AT YOU, THEN YOU LAUNCH ALL YOUR MISSILES. I THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS AND UNSTABLE SITUATION. IT IS TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT I BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS CAN NEVER COUNT ON THE FACT THAT WE WOULD NOT DO SO; THAT FOR US TO BE IN A POSITION WHERE WE WOULD HAVE TO DO SO WOULD SEEM TO ME TO BE UNSOUND. SECONDLY, WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF THE VULNERABILITY OR LACK OF VULNERABILITY OF OUR SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES, I SAID EARLIER THAT I THOUGHT TODAY'S SITUATION WAS ONE OF VERY HIGH-QUALITY DETERRENCE AND THIS IN PART IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT TODAY I WOULD SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF OUR SUBMARINES BEING VULNERABLE. THIS IS AN AGREEMENT THAT EXTENDS OUT FOR TEN YEARS. OVER TEN YEARS THINGS CAN HAPPEN, AND I WOULD HATE TO SEE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS UPON THE DETECTION AND MOBILIZATION OF OUR SUBMARINE FORCE.

MUNROE: UNDER THIS VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, CAN WE VERIFY WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE DOING? CAN WE TELL WHETHER THEIR MISSILES ARE BEING EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS ONLY UP TO THE LIMIT AND OTHER MISSILES ARE NOT BEING EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS?

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HOLSTEAD: WELL, I THINK YOU CAN TELL WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL MISSILE HAS MIRVS IN IT OR NOT. ...IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR AND SENATOR THURMAN SAYS, AS HE DID YESTERDAY, THAT HE IS SATISFIED ABOUT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM. I THINK THAT IF WE CAN CONVINCE HIM, WE CAN CONVINCE ALMOST EVERYONE THAT WE CAN TELL WHAT KINDS OF MISSILES ARE LIKELY TO HAVE MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON THEM. WE KNOW THEY HAVE THAT KIND

OF MISSILE, WE WILL KNOW FROM HAVING SEEN THE TESTS OF THAT MISSILE HOW MANY MIRVS IT IS LIKELY TO HAVE, AND WE CAN DO THE ARITHMETIC FROM THERE.

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